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POLITICAL REFORM AND 
REALIGNMENT IN ITALY (I) 
The Dynamics of The Italian-Electoral 
Reform And Its Transitional Outcome 
Hideko Magara<*)(料)
INTRODUCTION 
A REVOLUTION UNDER DEMOCRACY 
Italian society is experiencing a process of large-scale self-
reorganization in which numerous social， professional， cultural and 
economic groups have begun competing with each other in pursuit of 
various resources and rewards. Present Italy is in the midst of 
transition from the corrupted post-war politics controlled by the DC 
to a certain new form of politics whose nature is stil unclear. This 
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non-from changes regl立lethe of that unlike transformation， 
?????
democr・aticpolity to democracy， isconducted within a democratic 
regime. However， itcould be equal1y significant as the regime 
changes， depending on what its outcome will be.(l) 
The 1talian political system has been complicated. Political 
parties were heterogeneous with each other. They kept stable rela-
tionships with civil society by maintaining c10se ties to specific social 
groups. V oters， too， have been stable for a long period. (2) 1n the 1980s， 
however， ltalian society became increasingly more informed， more 
easily moblilzed it appeared to be somehow satisfied but more 
selfish. It became more demanding and more politically intolerant. 
“Italian society is more alert， more attentive， more impatient， and 
more suspicious exactly because it has become aware that a lot of its 
well-being depends on political decisions， and that a lot of its rewards 
go through political channels."(3) 1taly finally experienced a“revolu-
tion，" a large-scale political tr百 lsformationin the 1990s. ltalian 
politics once characterized by the DC-led Jうartitoιアaziabegan a proc-
ess of transition to some other form of politics， although sti1l unc1ear 
(1) For the same view， Guillermo 0' Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 
1986. Transition初 Democracy.Political Life afier Authoritarian Rule. 
Johns Hopkins University Press.; Hideko Magara. 1992. Sei，δDemokur-
ast: no Chosen (D仰 ocraticClzallenges in West Ewψe).Waseda Univel二
sity Press 
一 (2) Luciano Bardi and Leonardo Morlino. 1994.“Italy : Tracing the Roots 
七
( 
of the Great Transformation." in Richard Katz and Peter Mair， eds.， 
How P，αrties Organize : Chaηgeα抗dAdαttatioηi抗 PartyOrganiz“tums 
in Western Democracies. London : Sage. p‘244. 
(3) Gianfranco PasCjuino冒 199:3.“Introduction: A Case of I~egime Crisis，" in 
Gianfranco Pasquino' and Patrick McCarthy， eds.， The End 0/ Posι 
war Politics in Ita~Ji Tlze Lω'zdmark 1992 Elections.可vestview.p. 9. 
about whether it would be a form of ful democrazia or 
“videocrazi(4)プThetraditional dominant parties disappeared. New 
parties were born. The electoral system changed. There were many 
new faces among political leaders. The ltalian citizens even felt as if 
a series of political changes were substantive when they put an end to 
the First Republic and said hello to the Second Republic. 1s it correct， 
then， to conclude that such a“revolution" in ltalian politics can be 
considered as a real system-change in a strict sense， and that it could 
turn ltalian society in a more democratic direction? 
The stn~am of radical change in ltalian politics up to the March 
1994 elections can be divided into three phases. The first is the period 
between 1990 to 92 in which traditional parties tried to renovate their 
own identity (e.g. PCI/PDS)， and at the same time， relatively new 
forces (la Lega， i Verdi， la Rete) expanded their power. The second 
phase， 1992-93， saw the extinction of the traditional parties which had 
already been involved in a blizzard of confusion and had lost their 
raisoη d'etre. 1n the third phase， 1993-94， more radical and definitive 
transformation of the parties and the party system became a reality. 
Adoption of the new electorallaws， no doubt， heavily influenced such 
an overall collapse of the old party institutions_lS) 
Such transformation of ltalian politics cast one basic question : 
What brings on such a drastic change? What kind of factors brought = 
mutation to ltalian politics which had been“frozen川町 sincethe 公
(4) Giovanni Sartori's term， here referred by Bobbio. Norberto Bobbio e 
Romano Prodi. 1995.“Dialogo sul!'Ulivo，" Micro Mega. 5/95. p‘19. 
(5) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994.“Dai partiti ai poli. La politica delle alleanze，" 
Rivisfa ltaliana di Sι:ienza Politica. No. 3， anno xxiv. p. 497. 
post引!arera? The notable factors in the Italian case is that new 
pressures from outside the party systel1， the EU and the prosecuting 
l11agistrates in particular， promoted the change. Yet， the decisive 
factor that forces parties to transform is， inmany cases， electoral 
defeatsY) The political actor which has realized the harshness of 
defeat makes the maxil11um efforts to avoid a possible future defeat. 
The PDS， for instance， began to promote seriously not only its own 
further renovation but also the reformation of ltalian political institu-
tions， as a matter of life or death， in response to the devastating 
defeat at the 1992 elections. The ltalian case also shows that motives 
of avoiding defeat are not limited to the traditional politics. The 
self-made media mogul Silvio Berlusconi， whose business had come to 
a fatal standstill， tried to bypass immediate business defeats by 
entering the electoral market and by grasping political power to kick 
off his business stalemate.(8) 
Did Italian parties， then， experience a real transformation through 
a process of political reform? The political party must be considered 
as an independent force in two senses. Firstly， the political party is a 
strategic actor. It is located in a position in which it can start a 
change at its disposal and can assume the helm of the change. 
(6) Of course in Lipset and Rokkan's sense. S. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 
1967.“Cleavage Structures， Party Syst巴msand V oter Alignments : An 
Introduction，" in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan eds.， Pmか Systems
and Voter Aligmnents New York : Free Press. 
Piero Ignazi. 1991.“Attori e valori nella trasformazione del PCI，" 
Rivista ltaliana di Scienza Politica， no. 3， anno xxi， p. 523苧524.
L '&jJresso， 1 marzo 1994， Dieci buone ragioni per non fidarsi di 
Berlusconi. 
?????
(7) 
(8) 
Secondly， the political party is an adaptive actor. It reorganizes itself 
in order to secure its own survival in response to ever chan京ing
circumstances.(9) The political party constantly mutates. What is the 
criteria to assess whether such mutation is a short-term or limited or 
more general? Ignazi eη1phasizes that there are two types of transfor蜘
mation of the political party. The one is articolazione， inwhich parties 
reinforce their party organization by altering the immediate strat-
egies to break a deadlock without adding any significant change in 
their formal goals and ideology. The other is sostituzionc which 
means fundamental change in the very ideology of the parties， substi-
tution of their ultimate goals. 
Such a process of transformation entails a physical change in 
leadership composition. The elite in the old dominant alliance may 
well be substituted with new leaders refreshed with new ideology 
through a configurational change in the dominant alliance. Such an 
organizational innovation forces the parties to redefine their ultimate 
goals.“The true motive for change may lay in the necessity of funda-
mental ideological renovationYO)" Therefore， the real change of 
parties can be recognized by a thorough renovation of ideology on the 
one hand and substitution of leaders on the other. Ideological change 
? ? ? ? ? ?
is the real change of parties， which is clearly distinguished from 
short-term or limited changes of parties. 
(9) Gordon Smith. 1989.“A System Perspective on Party System Change，" 
Joumal of Thc(mtical Politics. 1 (9)， pp. 349-363. 
(10) Piero Ignazi. 1991.“Attori e valori nella transformazione de! PC1，" p. 
524 
REDEFINING IDEOLOGY， RE8UILDING PACTS 
Whether or not the ongoing ltalian political transformation finally 
will bring democratic outcome is stil unclear. What is clear at this 
point is that a prerequisite for a democratic system change is the 
formation of collective identity shared by most citizens.(ll) In the case 
of Italian transition， a party system change may lead to a broader 
macro change which would include the reorganizing of the relation. 
ship between the state and markets， between the public and the 
private. The party system， of course， isnot merely a sum of many 
organizations composing the system. The parties， with their own 
ideological， organizational profiles and propaganda or with 
coalitional strategies， determine the structure of the coming system. 
The party system， thus， can be determined only through the strategic 
interaction among the parties with regard to their own identity and 
alignment which each of them definesY2) 
In promoting their own projects， the parties propose the societal 
images with which electorates can share their identity. The more 
successful are the parties in doing this， the stronger influence they 
cast the electorates.(13) In a society whose political structure is chang司
ing， political mobilization becomes particularly important for the 
formation of a new identity since the old identity has been already 
(1) 
ハ (12)
Hideko Magara. 1992. Seio Demo!?urasi no CJ.品、仰(刀emocraticChal. 
leJl!NS in VイestEurope). 
Salvatore Vassallo. 1995.“La politica della coalizionI. Da un sistema 
partitico al'altro，" in Gianfranco Pasquino， a cura di， L 'Alternanza 
inattesa. Le elezioni del 27 marzo 1994 e leloro conseguenze. Rub‘ 
bettino Editore. 
(13) Gordon Smith. 1989“A System Perspective on Party System Change." 
lost. 
Parties'organizational mutation is deeply atfected by changes in 
the social bases the parties have be叩 dependingon and by various 
restraints of the institutions in which they are located. However， the 
transformation of each party and long-term changes in voters' politi-
cal culture alone cannot fully explain structural changes of party 
system. It is very possible that unexpected factors bring uncertainty 
to the party system and indispose the conventional way of recogni-
tion and decision-making process. When uncertainty increases， politi-
cal leaders no longer can resort to their traditional actions and are 
driven to shift their strategies to new and more adaptive ones. They 
are compelled to redefine the very structure of competition. In such 
a phase， a party's own identity becomes the object of the game.(14) 
Electoral reforms， whose impact on actual politics is enormous， 
often cause a significant change in the balance of power among 
actors. The party system， thus， loses short-term stability. In such an 
unstable and uncertain circumstance， actors manage to reach a kind 
of pact in order to make the coming new institutions the most 
favorable for themselves. 
Pacts are supposed to play significant roles during the process of 
regime change and it is argued that pacts are not indispensable for 
?????
democratization within the democratic regimes.(15) However， itis no 
wonder that pacts play an important role， though indirectly and 
U4) 
(15) 
Salvatore VassaIIo. 1995.“La politica deIIa coalizioni. Da un sistema 
partitico aII'altro，" pp. 52・53.
Guil1ermo Q'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transition to 
Democr.αε?・PoliticalLife after Authoritaria悦 Rule.
implicitly， in such an unstable and fluid situation as the ltalian 
“revolution" in which most of the former government members fel 
from power， and the actors who had played only marginal roles 
suddenly stepped up to the center of the political arena as indispens-
able protagonists. The institutional reforms in ltalian politics can be 
considered as one variety of modern pacts. Behind these pacts， itis 
possible to recognize the emergence of new actors such as prosecu-
tors， local politicians， businessmen， left-wings and right-wings who 
used to be the minority in politics. These new actors often break the 
socio-political equilibrium. 
During the transition of a political system， the political leaders 
locate themselves in hard conflicts in which they struggle to reorgan-
ize and redefine the symbolic constructions to crystallize the elector-
ate's political perception.(16) These severe conflicts， on the other hand， 
may well promote the formation of partial coalitions aiming at a 
bigger future victory. In the ltalian case， some political forces once in 
mutual rivalry (e.g. PDS， PSI and RC on the one hand， and AN and 
Lega on the other) reached new alliances. Such a process of coalition-
building can be viewed as a process of the partial pact formation. 
The dramatic shift of ltalian politics up to the 1994 elections can 
be grasped as a process of identity-redefinition and pact-building 
among various political parties. Whether this shift goes to a more 
acceptable direction or not depends on whether the parties are able to 
/¥ 
define new democratic identity relied on and sympathized with by 
citizens and to obtain their sufficient consensus to maintain it. In the 
(16) Salvatore Vass日10.1995.“La politica de1le coalizionI. Da un sistema 
partitico a1l'altro，" p. 54 
following article， 1 will review how the Italian parties， the PDS in 
particular， proceeded such a process under uncertain conditions. 1 wi1l 
also examine how the results of the 1994 elections should be evaluat-
ed in this respect of democratization. 
1. REFORMING A PARTY， REFORMING ITALlAN POLlTlCS 
OCCHETTO'S REFORM PROJECT 
The renovation of the PCI/PDS was a process in which the party 
integrated the two trends， its own in-party renewal on the one hand 
and an overall party realignment with .external political forces on the 
other， into one main stream of Italian political reform. The party was 
above al forced to cancel out internal confrontation among factions. 
At the same time it needed to explore how it ought to build new 
relationships with other parties. The leaders of the PCI/PDS were 
obliged to forge the consensus of opinion for change internally and to 
lead the entire leftist forces externally. 
1n retrospect， itwas never an easy task to renew the PCI to the 
PDS， not to mention to reform the Italian political system as a whole. 
Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s， it
became clear to every Italian voter that the retreat of the PC1 was 
? ?
?
? ?
inevitable. The PCI's vote， which had reached 34.4% in the 1976 
elections， dropped to 26.6% in the 1987 elections‘The severity sur-
rounding the party was obvious. Firstly， there was a harsh reaction 
from the intra-party left concerning the failure of Berlinguer's com-
ρromesso stonco which h:ad forced the party and the allied unions to 
concede to the conservatives but yielded no fruit. Secondly， owing to 
escalating terrorism， which engulfed the entire 1talian society with 
apprehension during the second half of the 1970s， inparticular the 
brigate rosse's kidnapping and murdering of ex-Prime Minister Aldo 
Moro， made the ltalian citizens allergic to the left. Thirdly， the 
structural change of Italian society caused by the increase of soft 
work such as information， communication and service industries 
weakened the traditional basis which had supported the left. Owing 
to these factors， which functioned multiply， the PCI's vote monoto-
nously declined. Alessandro N atta， successor of Berlinguer， recogniz-
ing the difficulty of such a situation， appealed the necessity of a 
self.白renovationof the party. However， his project of reform was 
limited only within the existing framework of the PCI.(I7) A more 
radical change， or“Copernican" conversion， which later lead to the 
entire political reform and realignment in Italy， was promoted for the 
first time by the next party leader Achille OcchettoYS) 
Occhetto's family background greatly affected his political ati-
tude. His father worked for Einaudi Publishers and kept close con-
tacts with intellectuals such as N atalia Ginsburg， Cesare Pavese and 
Italo Calvino. 1n such an atmosphere， itwas natural for him to study 
philosophy at the University of Mi1an and then enter the PCI. Upon 
being elected Secretary of the PC1 in June 1988， Occhetto immediate-
Iy proclaimed a“discontinuity". He was extremely active in promot-
? ? ?
?
? ? ?
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ing reforms， and appointed young and talented people with middle-
c1ass intellectual backgrounds including Walter Veltroni and Mas-
(18) 
L巴onardWeiberg. 1995. Tranゆrrnation01 Italian Cmnrnlmisn1. Trans. 
action Publishers 
Piero Ignazi. 1992. Dal PCI al PD5. Bologna : Il Mulino‘ 
??
simo D'Alema as his brain. He advocated “strong reformism" by 
which he appealed that the party should not ignore but transcend the 
traditional calss cleavages. Following the British case， he constructed 
a“shadow cabinet" by which he criticized the existing government 
and proposed a realistic alternative to the conservatives. Being in-
fluenced by Bobbio and Dahrendorf， he tried to redefine his party as 
a“liberal" party.(19) 
Such a scenario led by the middle-class intellectuals incurred a 
strong reaction from the in-party laborists. Occhetto and his young 
brains actively responded to this opposition by campaigning enthusi-
astically and persuasively around the party's local branches al over 
Italy. There were four major factions within the party at that time. 
Napolitano's faction on the right end asserted an alliance with the 
PSI. At the center， Occhetto was seeking further support for the 
party renewal. On his left hand， the Ingrao-Natta faction insisted on 
limited reform only within the PCI framework. On the left end， 
Cossutta's faction stil believed in Marx-Leninism and was strongly 
opposed to any scenario of reforms. 
The intellectuals inside and outside of the party also were divided 
into two groups. While the majority which consisted of the traditional 
intellectuals harshly blamed Occhetto's project， the new groups in-
? ?
?
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Massimo Cacciari and N orberto cluding Paolo Flores D' Arcais， 
Bobbio formed leftist clubs outside the party and showed their active 
support for reforms. The CGIL， the union closest to the PCI， initially 
was skeptical of Occhetto's reform scenario， and four sevenths of its 
Leonard Weiberg. 1995. The TYI仰ゆn附 tion01 Italian Communism. 
Transaction Publish巴rs
??
sub-federations were opposed to it. However， Luciano Lama and 
Bruno Trentin， leaders of the CGIL， recognized the significance of 
Occhetto's efforts and strongly supported them. Backing by the 
foremost leaders in the labor sector 1ike Lama and Trentin was 
definitely important for the self-renewal of the PCI/PDS. In addition 
to the active support by such eminent thinkers and unionists， opinion 
among the leftist youth which was initially divided showed an 
increasing sympathy to Occhetto， particularly to his assertions on 
ecology， global inter-dependence， peace and disarmament.(20) 
In addition to such an intra-party renovation， Occhetto aimed at 
c10sely linking his own party's renewal to the renovation of Italian 
politics. He intended to locate his party at the very center of Italian 
politics through a process of reforming and realigning Italian party 
politics. Occhetto's project contained his strong intention to increase 
the power of the leftist forces led by the PDS to the maximum by 
achieving electoral reforms. 
INITIATING THE ELECTORAL REFORMS 
Electoral reforms had already been considered in ltaly during the 
1980s by the so-called Bozzi Committee (1983・1985).The c1aim of 
reform promoters represented by Gianfranco Pasquino， a political 
scientist and Senator from the Sinistra lnd，ゆendente，however， was 
? ?
?
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soon wiped out， and a great deal of time passed before it came to be 
seriously examined. This was part1y because the ltalian economy 
recovered in the middle of the 1980s without requiring any effort to 
。 Ibid. 
renovate ltalian politics. lt was possible in ltaly to promote economic 
restructuring on the initiative of business managers， not by political 
initiative. The Fiat strike in 1980， for instance， can be viewed as a 
sign of the economic leaders' initiation of economic restructuring. In 
such a situation， the PCI， atthe beginning， strongly opposed electoral 
reforms claiming that the proportional representation was the fort of 
democracy. The PSI， too， was clinging to the existing institutions to 
maintain the party's upward electoral waves and was anxious about 
the reformers' proposal for change which would be advantageous 
only for the two large parties， the DC and the PCI. 
However， inthe 1990s， several factors accelerated ltalian political 
reforms圃 Oneis the issue of European integration. Unstable Italian 
politics faced with the severe problems of inflation and a vast deficit 
figure impressed the EC member countries with Italy's sheer vulnera-
bility. In order to adapt itself to the institutional framework of an 
integrated Europe such as the EMS and to acquire other member 
nations' trust， ltaly needed to reform its own politics. Just like Spain 
and Portugal in the 1980s which achieved political regime changes in 
order to obtain the EC memberships， ltaly was driven to democratize 
its politics to adapt to the EU. 
It should be noted that there had been a significant change in the 
balance of power among ltalian political actors prior to the incipien四。
ce of ltalian electoral reform. Such a change can be interpreted as ノ、
Craxi's legacy， which later incurred a resurgence of the ltalian far := 
right. Rehabilitation of the right in the historical 1994 elections was 
not achieved overnight. The rightist forces had firmly built their base 
under the Craxi government during the 1980s. Craxi's policies defi-
nitely contributed to the future rightist developments. 
THE OF RESURGENCE THE AND GOVERNMENT CRAXI THE 
ITALlALlAN RIGHT 
The neo fascist electorates consisted of the unemployed in the 
southern big cities and suburban bourgeoisie， small shop owners and 
artisans， lower middle-calss and authoritarian skilled workers. The 
MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano)， turning its back on actual politics， 
once was completely isolated from political disputes 011 economic and 
social policies， since other parties did not recognize it as a reliable 
negotiator. However， inthe 1980s many parties began to pay atten-
tion to the MSI considering it as a potential partner of coalitions. 
How and why could the MSI jump into the very center of Italian 
politics? Ex-prime minister Bettino Craxi's strategy of political 
realignment helped the far right's resurgence. 
The Craxi government， which pursued neo・liberalpolicies and 
political modernization， was backed mainly by urban professionals. 
lts modern image might not suggest any trait of reactionary neo-
fascist culture. Then prime minister Craxi， however， had watched for 
a chance to assume the reins of government by breaking down the 
“imperfect bipolarism" of the DC and the PCI upon the pretext of 
ending the paralysis of ltalian politics and by collecting small parties 
?
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around the PSI instead of the PCI. Craxi then asserted that the only 
way to enhance governability of ltaly and tQ stabilize and activate 
Italian politics was to fortify the competence of the President， 
making a strong state and concentrating power. This project was 
exactly what was expected by the neo-fashist. There arose then the 
most direct opportunity for the MSI to get out from the political 
ghetto and become a“normal" party aiming at the government like 
most other parties when Bettino Craxi gave his inauguration speech 
in 1983.(21) Craxi claimed that he needed a broader discourse with 
various political forces including opposition parties and referred to 
the necessity of institutional reforms. The MSI took this opportunity 
to actively appeal itself to a wider range of electorates beyond its 
traditional neo-fascist constituency. 
Out of a shared recognition that Italian politics did not function 
sufficiently， the Bozzi Committee led by chairman Aldo Bozzi started 
in October 1983. Serious consideration of institutional reforms includ-
ing the possibility of amending the N ational Constitution began. 
Neo-fascists tried to grasp these waves for reforms as an opportunity 
to extend their own influences. The committee required each minor-
ity opposition party including the pcr and the MSI to submit their 
reports in order to obtain broader consensus on institutional reforms. 
The MSr proposed constitutional reforms by which it asserted that 
its own party should be legitimatized. What the MSI stressed in its 
report was the importance of the strong state， the purity of the 
nation， a moral identity backed by a compeIling power. The party 
clearly showed its political stance in that institutional reforms should 
? ?
?
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be promoted in the framework of traditional fascism. It blamed the 
existing party system and proposed an idea of an utterly new consti-
tution. The MSI wanted to build a corporatist political system based 
on compulsory labor uniosism in the framework of the strong and 
Paul Furlong. 1992.“The Extreme Right in ltaly Old Orders and 
Dangerous Novelties，" Parliamentary Aβ'airs. vol. 45， no. 3， p.348. 
??
centralized state. It also proposed direct elections for the head of 
state with seven year terms in office， stronger executives， and more 
limited roles of parties. 
New Secretary Gianfranco Fini had an opportunity to access 
Craxi at the party head meeting on institutional reforms. After the 
talk， Craxi repeatedly cIaimed the necessity to consult with every 
party leader in order to promote the reforms. By that time the PSI 
had already confirmed its policy to realize the direct election of the 
President. Though the range of consensus between Craxi and Fini 
was limited， they came to share common interests concerning the 
stronger rule of the President. 
The problem of strengthening the President's power through 
direct elections became even more of a political matter in the 1990s. 
The President of ltaly had traditionaIly been located outside party 
politics. Since the power of the presidency was limited by Constitu-
tion， the president's role normally was only nominal. However， 
Francesco Cossiga， who had been President since his inauguration of 
1985， broke with tradition and began strongly intervening into party 
politics. His intervention expressed his anti-PCI anti-DC stance so 
clearly that both parties criticized that the President abused his 
power. Cossiga openly supported the project of directly electing the 
o President. There emerged almost a coalitional relationship among 
Cossiga himself， the PSI， the neo-fascists and the PLI which could be 
六 termedas the “President Party勺22)
(2) Ibid. p. 345巴356.
THE LEFTlST REACTION 
Under such a condition. the PCI decided on a radical shift includ-
ing the change of party name and symbol in October 1989. However， 
its in-party disputes were excessively intellectual and far from the 
general electorates. Faced with such a situation， Occhetto， with the 
Rimini Congress as a turning-point， judged that institutional reform 
was the best way to strengthen his own party and seriously began 
embarking on electoral reforms. 
Why， asa strategic actor， did the PCI/PDS， which once adhered 
to the proportional representation as the fort of democracy， turn to 
oppose it and choose the majoritarian system instead through the 
process of institutional reforms? The proportional representation 
system was now considered as the institution that only deepened the 
leftist fragmentation. The pcr， which had been in difficulty in terms 
。forganization， party members， finance and ideological solidarity， 
became too vulnerable to unite the leftist forces politically and to 
assume hegemony. However， the PCI， which thought that the leftist 
solidarity was stil imperative although poIitical unification of the 
left was impossible， cIung to its last hope of institutional so1idarity 
that could be attained through the majoritarian system which would 
divide al the competing actors into two big confrontational blocks. 
? ?
?
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The impact of such a policy-change of the second largest party in 
ltaly was significant. The project of majoritarianism， which had simply 
been the “obscur objet du desir" among a handful of reformers， 
suddenly turned to be a cIean and clear strategy for the PCr. 
Occhetto placed political reforms high on his objectives when he 
promoted the transformation of the PCI into the PDS. He embraced 
a scenario that a leftist goverロmentwould become a reality by way 
of electoral reforms. His party's renovation was inseparably related 
to the reforms of ltaliari politics. For. him， therefore， the success of 
political reforms was a necessary precondition for the success of his 
own party's renewal and survival. 
TOWARD THE REFERENDUM 
When not only the 9th legislature but also the 10th faced the crisis 
of dissolution， the very form of government itself came to be ques-
tioned. The renewal of the electoral system and amending the Consti-
tution began to be argued. While乱1arioSegni of the DC suggested the 
introduction of the French style double ballot system， Mino Martinaz-
zoli (DC) and Massimo D' Alema (PCI) agreed to the idea proposed by 
constiutional scholars to utilize the referendum to abolish the exist-
ing electoral system. While the main stream of the DC led by Giulio 
Andreotti opposed these institutional reforms， about one third of the 
Christian Democratic MPs including De Mita's faction， the centrists 
and the moderates supported the reforms. In February 1990， an 
extra-partisan committee of referenda promotion asked the Court of 
Cassation Office to enforce a referendum to eradicate the on-going 
electoral law of the Senate. The chairman of the committee was 
o Mario Segni. The Committee， which consisted of the DC， PLl， radi-
cals， PRI， Independent Left and PCI， was literally an extra-partisan 
八 politicalgroup. The Committee also tied civil society to politics in 
that many voluntary groups such as ltalian Christian W orkers 
Association， the N ational W omen V oters' Association， etc.， par-
ticipated in it. (23) 
To carry out the referendum， no less than 500，000 people's signa-
tures supporting the shift of three fourths of the existing proportional 
representation districts into the majoritarian system were required. It 
was assumed that such a change would make the role of individual 
candidates more substantial. At the same time， itwas expected that 
coalitions among parties and political groups would be formed to 
back these.candidates on both lacal and national bases. While the 
personalities of the candidates themselves were supposed to become 
definitely important， the parties stil maintained strong influences. On 
the local level， itwas proposed that electorates would choose local 
governments through directly electing their mayors. However， coI-
lecting signatures of more than 500，000 citizens was a much more 
difficult task than expected. In spite of ardent appeals for the referen-
dum by Mario Segni and ex-Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita， the 
centrists and leftists within the DC were not easily mobilized. Even 
the factions which had usually been progressive strongly opposed the 
referendum. The Christian Democratic mobilization of electorates 
was conducted on individual candidates' bases. Thus， inSegni and De 
Mita's constituencies they collected sufficient signatures， but in other 
districts the situation was quite unsatisfactory.(24) 
The other key actor beside Mario Segni that promoted the refer-
? ?
? ?
? ? ?
endum was the PDS. The PCI. as a defender of the Italian constitu-
tion， constantly safeguarded the politicaI system based on the multi-
Gianfranco Pasquino. 1992.“The Electoral Reform Referendums"， in
Robert Leonardi and Fausto Anderlini， eds. Italian Politics. A Review 
Vol 6. New York : Pinter. p. 9-11. 
Ibid. p. 14-17. 
(お)
(24) 
party proportional representation in spite of its vulnerability as a 
form of parliamentary government. Occhetto was the first leader of 
the PCI that pointed out the necessity of fundamentally reforming the 
political institutions. He did so not only by attributing dysfunctions of 
the Italian political system simply to the coalitional governments but 
also by showing the infelicity of the very institutions of ltalian 
politics : Occhetto made it broadly recognized that the reforms were 
truly imperative. For Occhetto， the success of the referendum was 
conserva-essential for the success of his new party. However， the 
tives (leftists) within the party harshly criticized Occhetto who did 
not hesitate in urging a discontinuity from the traditional Togliatti 
line in order to rebuild the party's new relationship with a broader 
civil society. Ingrao's faction in particular attacked him saying that 
Occhetto's project lacked sociality and was not at al different from 
that of the PSI 
The PCI as a whole supported the referendum finally at the 
national congress. Yet the task of collecting signatures did not go 
reformers' group smoothly because of the friction between the 
backing Occhetto and the opposition within the party. Occhetto and 
his supporters actively reacted and gathered 190，000 signatures. 
However， the signature-collecting campaign was so dull in general 
that the PCI needed to mobilize fund raising campaigns at its {'Unita 
? ? ? ? ? ?
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festival. In August 1990， the signatures finally reached 500，000. 
Behind this difficulty there was strong resistance among many 
politicians to the electoral reforms. The PSI was in the central 
position of such rebellion. Giuliano Amato of the PSI negated the 
very legitimacy of the referendum in that it proposed new laws 
instead of abolishing the existing laws. Craxi expected the direct 
election of the President rather than the introduction of the major-
itarian system. He embraced a scenario in which he himself would 
become the Preident endowed with a centralized power and elected 
by the nation. 
There was， at the same time， serious misgiving that the small 
parties would vanish with a shift to the majoritarian system. Also the 
PCI was under the apprehension that such a change would bring 
about a vast loss of its own votes. The in-party reformers ardently 
tried to persuade their colleagues that the PCI would become able to 
change its old and negative image of persistent opposition and to 
increase its votes by forming an effective coalition instead of simply 
losing votes.(25) 
Meanwhile， chairman of the referendum promoting committee， 
Mario Segni， was isolated within the DC. Segni's supporters， which 
consisted of catholic groups outside the DC such as ACLI and FUCI， 
were usually close to the in-party left. However， Segni himself was 
not leftist in the DC. Furthermore， the Christian Democratic leftist 
leader Ciriaco De Mita's reform stance was quite inexplicable. In his 
term of office as Prime Minister he did not pay any particular efforts 
for electoral reforms. During the referendum campaign period， he 
??????
suddenly withdrew his support of Mario Segni. 
Just at that time， ominous clouds began to gather over the coali-
tion government. The ltalian economy was deteriorating. The growth 
rate of the GDP was only 2%， but the inflation rate jumped to 6.5%. 
(25) Ibid. p. 19. 
1n October 1990， the Gladio scandal was revealed and the citizens' 
distrust of the DC deepened. While abstention increased at the local 
election of May 1990， the Lega Lombarda which rebelled against the 
traditional party politics lept to 20.2%. 
THE RISE OF THE LEGA 
The Lega Nord， which originally stemmed from the rightist 
and immigrant anti-Mezzogiorno claiming movement nationalist 
ostracism， became socialized at the general elections by thoroughly 
attacking ρartitocrazia， party control of politics and society. Being 
initially protected by the proportional representation system， the 
Lega Nord rapidly increased its votes. The Italian electorallaw， i. e. 
the proportional representation without any entry hurdle， provided 
the best condition for local parties like the Lega Nord to enter into 
national politics. (26) 
The rise of the Lega Nord was helped by the fact that the MSI 
was going against the political current of the times. Most parties， 
both new and old， appealed to decentralization and local autonomy. 
The MSI that aimed at rebuilding the strong state and national 
identity impressed ltalian voters with its backwardness. Contrary to 
the MS1， the Lega Nord emerged from the decline of traditional 
culture and value systems. The 1talian political map was once clearly 
??????
divided into two : the N orth East controlled by the DC and the Middle 
ltaly controlled by the PCI. Until the 1970s it was possible for the DC 
。 Mauro Calise. 193.'‘Remaking the ltalian Party System : How Lijphart 
Got It Wrong by Saying lt Right，" West European Politics. Vo116， No 
4. (Oct. 193). p. 545-560. 
to appeal various groups of electorates for ideological solidarity upon 
the pretext of anti-communism. However， the DC lost its centripetal 
force in the 1980s when the communist menace was weakened and the 
necessity to present a common front against the PCI to prevent a 
birth of communist government disappeared. Moreover， the waves of 
anti-DC and anti-仰rtitocraziagrew radically owing to the reveal of 
political corruption and cititzens' distrust of politics. 
As an economic background which accelerated this current， the 
tax reform carried out in the first half of the 1980s had considerable 
influences. It became difficult to maintain the Italian welfare state 
after the economic crisis of the 1980s and a phenomenon called “tax 
reaction" emerged. Since the Italian direct and indirect tax systems 
were complicated and the administration was inefficient， itwas 
easier in Italy to evade taxes compared with other European coun-
tries. However， thanks to a series of tax reforms at the beginning of 
the 1980s， tax collection became effectively monitored and conducted 
more compulsori1y. Tax evasion became difficult. When the self-
employed who had evaded taxes were forced to pay heavy taxes， they 
turned to become the anti-welfare forces claiming that the wealth 
they had made in the north was wasted by the “poor and idle" 
southerners. 
The Lega Nord was based not on the racial identity but on the 九
negative identity of people in northern communities. The dependent 公
south， the drug addicted immigrants， corrupted politicians and inefi-
cient bureaucrats in Rome-such negative mobilization of the north-
ern Italians to say“N 0" to al these things yielded exceptional effect. 
The mobilization was based on the material structure of their inter-
ests which was clearly different from mere protests and the racial 
identity. The effect of“tax reaction" was intense. Moreover， the 
Lega Nord was successful in establishing -a positive identity， i.e. 
diligence， respect for family， local autonomy. The identity the Lega 
Nord coined was a conservative identity of the people who had been 
betrayed by the traditional parties and menaced by the outsiders such 
as foreign countries， immigrants and the Mezzogiorno.(27) 
Contrary to the preceding European social movements such as 
feminism and peace movements which were developed in the urban 
areas utilizing the social and organizational networks and sought a 
base for their own legitimacy within the existing political frame-
work， the Lega emerged in a small town in northern Italy and 
rebelled against every institution linked to the power structure of 
Rome. Its rise reflected the inadequacy of the Italian state， politicaI 
corruption， and the ineptitude of the political system itself_ The Lega 
was a rational response to the cultural crisis caused by the collapse 
of collective identity， and it properly fil1ed the ideological vacancy 
without offering any effective solutions to these problems.(28) 
The Lega Nord which rapidly grew under the institutional protec・
tion of proportional representation seemed unquestioningly to sup-
port maintaining the system. Therefore， inthe early autumn of 1992， 
??????
the Lega hit the Italians by surprise when it agreed to reforming the 
Paul Furlong. 1992.“The Extreme Right in Italy : Old Orders and 
Dangerous Novelties，" p. 345-356. 
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electoral system into a majoritarian one. Behind such a decisional 
shift， there was Umberto Bossi's shrewd calculation based on the 
electoral system theory : the majoritarian system would turn to the 
advantage of locally concentrated parties like the Lega if the bipar-
titism was not yet well-structured.(29) 
The ltalian citizens agreed to the reduction of the existing elec-
tions of the Deputies from three or four preference votes into one at 
the referendum of June 9， 1991. The turnout of the referendum was 62. 
5%. If the persistent attack by the majority of the DC and the PSI is 
taken into account， citizens' participation was not low. The result 
itself showed a high level of support (95.6%) in spite of the low tone 
of the pre-referendum media campaign. The ltalians strongly wanted 
a political system change. 
2. THE TRANSITION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 
THE 1992 ELECTIONS 
The impact of the 1991 referendum was enormous. In the strict 
sense， however， itwas between spring and summer of 1992， when the 
transition of the party system began. At that time， the uncertainty in 
the electoral market rapidly grew and the relationship among the 
??????
parties， either rival or coalitional， needed to be fundamentally reor-
ganized. As a matter of fact， even the entries of utterly new actors 
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into the political market became possible.(30) 
The electoral volatility already increased in the elections of May 
1990 and April 1992， in which the concentration of votes in the 
traditional two big parties visibly retreated and fragmentation dee司
pened. Such a situation forced the old parties to transform them-
selves into new ones (PCI/PDS for instance). At the same time the 
dynamics of the old regime's breakdown developed into the referen-
dum movements. Mario Segni became a hero. 
1n retrospect， the 1992 elections clearly showed that ltalian poli時
tics was drastically changing. Umberto Bossi's triumph in northern 
Italy， Leoluca Orlando's farewell to the DC and succeeding promotion 
of network movement， laRete-these phenomena served as a valve 
of the citizens' distrust of the established parties and their wrath 
toward political convention and corruption. The 1talian nation was 
anxious about political society and it could no longer withstand the 
existing politics. While they sought justice， Italians were also 
controIled by anti-statist sentiments which Umberto Bossi effectively 
stimulated. 
1n this period， the PDS under the leadership of AchilIe Occhetto 
was experiencing a significant renewal， in which it struggled to 
obtain support from new social sectors. Unfortunately， however， such 
九 aneffort should have been made earlier. When the PCI started its 
:- own reform， the ltalian economy had already entered into a down-
六 wardcurve. The big enterprises resorted to lay.offs and factory 
rockouts. Under such conditions， itwould be a great risk for the PCI/ 
PDS not to stand on the side of workers. Moreover， the PDS was 
driven to assert the necessity of austerity poIicies and public expendi. 
ture restraint which were quite unpopular among workers. Occhetto 
after al proclaimed maintaining real wages and continuing the scala 
mobile in order to protect traditional supporters of the party， by 
which he was driven to confront with the CGIL leader Bruno Trentin 
who seriously appealed for wage restraint in spite of harsh rebellion 
among the ranl王andfile workers.This event exposed the nebulosity 
of the PDS and hurt its image as a potential governing party. In the 
1992 general elections the PDS chose the defensive strategy of con. 
solidating the traditional votes instead of the offensive strategy of 
seeking new support from independent voters. The PDS wanted to be 
a governing party， but at the same time it wanted to be the opposi-
tion. It could not， ultimately， determine which it should choose. The 
PDS， which lacked determination and unsteadily oscillated， did not at 
al seem to succeed in making a new identity for itself which was 
necessary for its own renewal.(31) 
In the 1992 elections， some signs toward a party system change 
already appeared， though stil modest at the nationallevel. However， 
just after the elections an event that shook ltalian politics to the roots 
and later overturned the party alignment occurred. lt was the revela-
tion of the Tangentopoli scandals and a start of the severe investiga-
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tion on the part of the prosecution. The investigation brought about 
Patrick McCarthy. 1993.“Th巴ltalianCommunists Divide-and Do Not 
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a significant change in the re1ationship between the parties and the 
institutions and also between the parties and society.(32) 
THE WAVES OF SCANDALS 
Many scholars attribute the deve10pment of po1itical reforms in 
Ita1y to the breakdown of the co1d-war structure. They argue that 
Ita1y with the biggest communist party in the Western countries 
needed to pour enormous politica1 energies to maintain non-
communist governments骨 Accordingto them the end of the Cold War 
made it possib1e to convert such energies to political reform. Yet， the 
driving force of the lta1ian politica1 reforms cou1d not be found only 
within the traditiona1 parliamentary arena such as the emergence of 
new patterns of coa1itions and of new 1eaders.(33) The big waves of 
scandals surged exact1y when the 10ss of identity among the Catholics 
and communists just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall triggered 
the localist waves. 
It had been necessary for the political renovation of Italian 
citizens to overcome two high barriers. One was a bad convention 
called partitocrazia， which meant the suffocation of civil 1ife caused 
by the governing parties' thorough contro1 of every fie1d in politics， 
public administration， society and economy owing to the lack of 
九 governmentalternation and consequent1y fixed the ba1ance of power. 
っ Theother was conglutination between politics and public administra-
6 tion in which the distorted relationship between politicians and the 
(3) Patrick McCarthy. 1992.“The Referendum of 9 June，" in Stephen 
Hellman and Gianfranco Pasquino， eds. Italian Politics. A Review Vol 
欠 Pinter.p. 12. 
public sector injured the citizens' poIitical and social rights. The 
governing coalitions c1ientilisticaIly treated their supporters and 
scattered vested interests and services through the bureaucratic 
networks， sometimes beyond the authorized Iimits of power. 
What was particularIy unpleasant was the so-caIled CAF， a secret 
relay agreement among Craxi， Andreotti and Forlani， which lasted 
from 1986 to 1992. The bosses of the DC and the PSI secretly agreed 
to alternate in taking the post as head of the coalition governments 
in the near future prior to and regardless of the electoral results. The 
agreement was nothing but the personalization of Italian politics by 
a smaIl number of party bosses. The arrogant manner in which the 
Prime Minister and the most important posts of Italial politics， the 
Presidency， were set beforehand among themselves regardless of the 
electoral results provoked Italial voters to anger. 
The Tangentopoli scandals disc10sed the evils of Italian politics 
which covered almost the entire society in the most conspicuous and 
the most brutal manner. The trivial corruption case brought on by a 
Milan construction company aiming at public works' concessions 
developed later on an unexpected and rapid scale into unprecedented 
bribery scandals that eventually yielded a long list of arrests of the 
VIP in Italian political and business society. In the Spring of 1993， it
? ?
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became c1ear that the very core of the ltaIian economy was depraved 
when the prosecution began to investigate such huge conglomerates 
as Fiat and OIivetti which produced about 4% of the GDP. Being 
examined by the prosecution， Cesare Romiti， President of Fiat， in-
dicated the deep structure of corruption :“…even Fiat， the biggest 
company in Italy， cannot but pay money if demanded by the poIiti-
cians." Among politicians， the sequential Prime Ministers of coalition 
governments led by the DC and PSI， ultra big names including Giulio 
Andreotti， Arnoldo Forlani， Bettino Craxi， Ciriaco de Mita were 
Andreotti who led seven coalition governments as investigated. 
Prime Minister was suspected of his alleged link to the Mafia. 
THE MAY 1993 REFERENDUM AND THEREAFTER 
A move toward the electoral reform was spurred on in order to 
wipe out such political corruption. At the referendum of May 1993， 
ltalian people agreed to the proposal to ease proportional representa-
tion and shift the electoral system to mainly a majoritarian one. 
What was more significant with the referendum， which recovered the 
gradually declining electoral turnout and made no less than 2.9 
million people regardless of age and sex respond “yesぺwasthat， 
through its process， itsubstantially consolidated the movement for 
institutional reform as a response to the crisis of ltalian politics 
which lacked effective government alternative. Compared with the 
1991 referendum， many old guard politicians had already disappeared 
because of the scandals. The groups which publicly opposed the 
referendum had shrunk. In the 93 referendum， the PSI headed by 
Giorgio Benvenuto， the DC led by Mino Martinazzoli and even the Lega 
supported the changes.(34) An electoral reform initiative by which 75% 
?????
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of the Senate would be shifted from the PR system to the majoritarian 
(34) Piergiorgio Corbetta and Arturo M. L. Parisi. 1995.“The Referendum 
on the Electoral Law for the Senato : Another Momentous April." in 
Carol Mershon and Gi呂nfrancoPasquino，巴ds.，Italian Politics : Ending 
the Firsf Republic. Westview. p. 76 
system gained overwhelming support of voters (83%). Mario Segni 
who organized the referendum became the “ltalian Clinton". 
The poIiticaI map at that time was divided into three parts : the 
Lega controlIed northern 1taly， the PDS Middle Italy and the Catho-
lics the south. The electoral reform was intended to avoid deepening 
these existing geographicaI political cleavages (the 25% PR system 
remained in order to save the small forces， inparticular the centrists 
which could hardly win under the majoritarianism)， while it needed to 
respond to the national demands to overcome the problems surround-
ing the PR system which had been indicated in the referendum. 
Electoral reform became thus a space of severe competition among 
the parties for their survival.(35) 
What should be stressed with the referendum movements was that 
its crosscutting nature yielded a success. The referendum appeals 
were conducted in a mixing-cards manner with a subtle avoidance of 
the traditional axis of left目rightconfrontation.(36) Through such a 
process of referendum promotion， the politically and socially hetero-
geneous actors could cooperate with each other.(37) 1n such a new 
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trend， itwas asserted that the left was neither to be renovated， nor 
(38) 
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to be rebuilt， nor to be reconsidered， nor to be reformed， but it should 
be radically recreated from the beginning.(38l A coalitional project 
totally different from the traditional one thus emerged. 
THE LEFTIST REALlGNMENT 
The evolution of the ltalian left in 1993 showed some sort of 
inevitability or logic. As time passed on， the opportunity for the 
leftist reclamation lessened and the possible range of choices rapidly 
became narrower. In this context， the formation of the ρrogressisti 
was a logical consequence.“By year's end only three real choices 
remained for forces spanning the progressive center and the Left : 
alliance， merger or oblivion."(39l 
The ρrogressisti took a tortuous course until they reached the 
formation of the Alleanzaρrogressista in February 1994. Even after 
then， the alliance had various difficulties， not to mention ideological 
diversity， so it was not free from structural vulnerability. 
The Carlo Azeglio Ciampi government that was formed after the 
closing of Giuliano Amato Government (July 1992 to April 1993) 
attracted much attention as a government of non-politicians and 
technocrats. The Ciampi government of professors can be grasped as 
the government that determined the direction of the transition 
toward the reforms necessary to renovate ltalian politics.(40l This last 
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government of the First Republic provided the ltalian left with an 
(40) 
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opportunity， though indirectly， toform a coalition. 
Initially， Romano Prodi， ex-president of the IRI， was the first 
candidate to succeed Amato. 1ronically， however， the PDS blocked 
Prodi at this point in that he was too close to the DC. 1n any case， the 
coming Prime Minister must have fulfi1led the following two condi-
tions. First， he/she needed to be a person who was not a professional 
po1itician that had total1y 10st the citizens' trust because of a series 
of scandals. Secondly， he/she had to be a person capable enough to 
solve the severe economic problems and to recover the credibility of 
the ltalian economy in international markets. Car10 Azeglio Ciampi， 
the President of the Bank of 1taly， not only satisfied these two 
conditions， but also had utterly no relationship with any scandal in 
past. In constructing his Cabinet， Ciampi neither parted completely 
from any party nor neglected the demands of each party. He did not 
resort to any outrageous political marketing in determining the 
ministry posts， and appointed many university professors. N otewor. 
thy was the fact that he opened a way for the PDS to commit itself 
in a future government by providing several leftist scholars with 
Cabinet posts : Luigi Spaventa from the Sinistra lndependente (1n-
dependent Left) was assigned as Budget Minister， Augusto Barbera 
from the PDS as Par1iamentary Relations Minister， Vincenzo Visco 
as Treasure Minister， Luigi Berlinguer， cousin of Enrico， as Educa- 八
tion and Science Minister， Francesco Rutelli from the Verdi (Greens) 公
soon collapsed when three ministers from the PDS and Francesco 
Rutelli furiously resigned their posts in response to the Deputies' 
negating the request of the Milan Prosecution to litigate Craxi. Yet， 
this event made the PDS and the Verdi approach each other， and both 
of them began to show clear support for the Ciampi government 
thereafter.(41) 
THE IMPASSE OF THE PSI 
One of the most direct factors that generated the dynamics of the 
leftist realignment was the sudden self.disruption of the PSI which 
had been located at the very core of the political power in Italy. The 
first dissonance within the party began in February 1992 when the 
Milan scandal was revealed. The retreat at the April 1992 elections 
spurred such discord. There were three major factions in the PSI at 
that time: Craxi's faction， the reformers' faction led by Claudio 
Tan. Marte1li， and the centrist faction. When the unprecedented 
gentoρoli scandals were disclosed， Craxi withdrew from the front but 
tried to play the role of king maker. However， when the investigation 
of the prosecution suggested a high possibility that even Martelli， a 
young leader who was supposed to take over Craxi， was involved in 
the Banca Ambrosiano scandal， the PSI was soon forced to the verge 
of organizational breakdown. Giorgio Benvenuto， ex-Secretary of the 
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third largest trade union UIL， was installed as the leader of the PSI 
after Craxi on February 12， 1993. The situation for Benvenuto was 
(41) Gianfranco Pasquino and Salvatore Vassallo. 1995.“The Government 
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simply harsh. Chaxi's control of the party stil1 continued in spite of 
his absence， and it soon became clear that Benvenuto was merely a 
nominalleader. To make the matters worse， the debt of the PSI was 
by far greater than expected. A knotty problem concerning how to 
cope with the financial difficulty heavily bent over出enew leader. 
Yet， Benvenuto struggled to resuscitate the PSI and tried to reform 
the party to erase the scars of the scaldals. But his efforts for reform 
collapsed， being strongly blocked by the Craxi faction. With regard 
to electoral reform， Benvenuto supported the idea of French-style 
double ballots， while the Craxi faction opposed even the political 
reform referendum itself. Benvenuto resigned the Secretary on May 
20， only 100 days since his installation， without making any substan. 
tial demonstration for change .(42) 
On May 28， Ottaviano Del Turco was elected the new Secretary of 
the PSI succeeding Benvenuto with 82% support. Del Turco， origi-
nally from the largest trade union CGIL， tried to wipe out the Craxi 
color just as Benvenuto did， and proposed a new party coalition 
strategy. However， the PSI lacked the ability of self-renewal. 
THE DILEMMA OF THE PDS 
It was very possible for Occhetto to locate his own party's reform 
??????
in a wider framework to renovate the entirety of Italian left， ifit was 
taken into account that Craxi's PSI which had enjoyed a strong 
leadership was almost disappearing from the Italian political scene. 
Among the main traditional parties， the PDS was the only party that 
(必) Martin Rhodos. 1995.“Reinventing the Left : The Origins of Italy's 
Progressive Alliance，" p. 116.117. 
did not suffer fatal damages of the scandals. Such a big merit， atthe 
same time， put on the brakes for the organizational renewal of the 
PDS. Logistically speaking， the “anti-CAF" concertation with Mario 
Segni et al. brought a certain success on the one hand. Nonetheless， 
such a success， on the other hand， retarded the PDS's irトpartyres-
tructuring that was required to renovate its relationship with other 
parties and groups. The leaders of the PDS did not have any suspicion 
about the feasibility of their scenario in which the PDS should lead 
the leftist realignment taking advantage of the opportunity of the 
electoral reform， while maintaining each group's autonomy. As a 
matter of fact， Occhetto， who expected the realization of double tour 
system， was optimistic enough to consider that he could build a 
coalition by the time of the second ballot， even after the first ballot 
would have been carried out. When the proposal for the double tour 
was rejected in June 1993 in the Senate (383 to 134)， Occhetto was 
forced to reconsider his coalitional strategy. 
The difficulties of the PDS were often related to the Rijondazione 
Comunista (RC) which had been formed in February 1991 by ex-
communist hard-liners who did not approve of the shift of the PCI to 
the PDS. From spring to summer of 1993， the RC was so influential 
that it almost seemed to rob of the PDS' votes. The RC severely 
八 blamedthe PDS in that the latter was too concessive to Amato and 
合 Ciampiand that the CGIL leader Bruno Trentin agreed to abolish the 
六 scalamobile， and asserted that only the RC could protect the workers' 
interests. The Verdi and the Rete supported the RC. The PDS was 
again faced with a leftist dilemma through the process of its own 
renewal. 
The biggest problem for the PDS was to what extent it could 
abandon its hegemony to be on the same par with other center-left 
groups_ The other crucial problem was related to whether a further 
coalition， which was required in the competition under the majoritar-
ian system， could overcome the ideological divergence among the 
participating groups.(43) As a matter of fact， not a small number of 
people in the PDS stil embraced a dream to seek the old leftist 
alliance without the centrists. 
Its relationship with the Alleanza Democratica (AD)， Segni's Pact 
and the RC was particularly thorny. Occhetto's relationship with 
Segni was deteriorating. The two cooperated with each other until 
the 1993 referendum was carried out. N onetheless， by the end of the 
referendum， they had already lost a shared base and only contradic-
tions stood out. When Segni joined a coalition with the AD in June 
1993， Occhetto began to be driven by misgivings that the reformist 
initiative might be plundered by the centrists. Segni actually claimed 
that the PDS must be reshuffled to form a new reformist center-left. 
Occhetto did not hide his discomfort saying that Segni's project was 
just like Craxi's. Some pro-AD groups within the PDS felt anxious 
that the discord between Segni and Occhetto might hurt the possible 
??????
formation of wider leftist alliance including the centrists and stressed 
that the both sides should make mutual concession. 
Ibid. p. 125. (43) 
/¥ 
/¥ 
THE LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 1993 
The June local elections were carried out in such a situation. The 
decline of the centrists was outstanding. While the PLI， PR1 and 
PSDI barely survived， the decay of the DC and the PS1 was obvious. 
Contrarily， the right was stable， and so was the left. The Lega gained 
the biggest success. N ot only did they triumph in Milan， the Lega also 
seemed to establish hegemony across northern Italy. It was very 
plausibe that the Lega would expand its influence further. What was 
striking at the June local elections was that the moderate voters 
increasingly changed their voting patterns. The elections also sug-
gested the possibility that the personalization of competitions would 
diffuse. The confrontation between the well-knowns such as Rutelli 
vs. Fini in Rome or Bassolino vs. Mussolini in N aples seemed to 
become more prevalent(44). 1n such a context， the June local elections 
were seen as a chance for new politics to emerge : Anti-statist Lega's 
hegemony in northern Italy and the neo時protectionsistperonists' 
control of the South. The confrontation between these two conserva-
tives on the one hand and on the other hand the progressisti-a new 
national coalition among the left， environmental protectionists， 
reformers， democratic Catholics-was interpreted as the essence of 
the 1993 local elections.(45) 
1n the June local elections which were carried out under the new 
rule of double tour by which electorates could directly choose their 
例) Giacomo Sani. 1994.“Una vigiIia di incertezza，" Rivista Italiana di 
Scienza Politica， no. 3 anno xxiv， p. 411-413 
(45) Francesco Rutelli. 1993. Un progetto per Roma， un segna!e per !'Italia. 
Micro Mega 4/93. 
Mayors， the PDS won a greater success than expected. The June and 
N ovember local elections of 1993 were the apprropriate test case to 
observe how various political groups would grasp the restrictions and 
possibilities of the new system and how quickly they would react and 
adopt themselves to such a change. This test particularly assessed the 
ability of the political leaders to find out the best formula for 
alliances that corresponded to the new electoral logic. The test also 
drew particular attention in terms of technical and operational 
concems on how electorates would respond to the new electoral 
system.(46) The mayoral elections were grasped as the test for 
coalitional strategies for the general elections in the near future. The 
PDS showed persistence. By flexibly building various alliances with 
the republicans， Verdi， Rete and Patto Segni according to the diverse 
situations of each district， the PDS acquired many victories. These 
results made the importance of leftist coalitions firmly recognized. 
IN PURSUIT OF NEW COALlTION 
Meanwhi1e， the decline of the PSI became inevitable. After the 
devastating defeats in the June local elections， the PSI was forced to 
vacate its symbolic headquarters at via Corso， Rome， on July 4 
because of the financial difficulties. The prominent and indispensable 
??
?
? ? ? ?
ex-colleagues had already left the party. While Benvenuto was seek-
ing for some new form of relationship with the PDS and AD， Del 
Turco， rejecting Occhetto's approach， pursued cooperation with the 
centrist AD. Del Turco's strategy seemed to anticipate the future， 
Giacomo Sani. 1994.“Una vigilia di incertezza，" p. 409. 白。
particularly when Mario Segni and the Catholic reformists merged in 
the AD in July. Nonetheless， other leaders of the PSI did not support 
Del Turco's centrist line. Most of them judged that the coa!ition with 
the PDS was the only choice left for them. Within the PSI， the Craxi 
faction was determining its own line that would later lead to the 
conservative merger toward Forza liωlia. Those who otherwise might 
have backed Del Turco had already left the PSI. Those who remained 
in the PSI were often fence sitters interested in joining other parties 
also. However， the situation suddenly changed when Mario Segni 
parted from the AD and again returned to the Catholic right. The 
final place for SegnI was， after al， a merger in the old DC. After the 
electoral reform yielded some fruit， Segni approached Mino Martin-
azzoli of the DC and left the AD. He later formed a centrist group，出e
Pattoρer I'Italι 
For the groups which remained in the AD， itbecame clear that 
they could not take office without cooperating with the PDS under 
the majoritarian system. Segni's farewell to the AD， on the one hand， 
enabled Occhetto to discard his hesitation in cooperating with the 
centrists. These events decisively influenced on Del Turco. For him， 
only one choice was now possible : coalition with the PDS. At the 
beginning of November 1993， no fewer than 1000 socia!ists gathered 
to form the Unione dei soc必listiverso l'uni.段 deiρrogressisti.Del 
?????
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Turco could not but join such a trend.(47) 
Segni's separation from the AD， on the other hand， brought a 
側)
Martin Rhodes， 195.“Reinventing the Left : The Origins of Italy's 
Progressive Alliance." p. 118-121. 
Ibid. p. 126. 
(41) 
certain result that strengthened the relationship among the AD and 
the PDS and other leftist forces.(48) The confrontation between 
Occhetto and Segni and then Segni's subsequent return to the right 
made the leftists feel a load off their shoulders and simplified and 
fortified the leftist solidarity. Yet， one problem was stillleft : how to 
get along with the RC. 
Del Turco had clarified his stance not to cooperate with the RC， 
though he became closer to the PDS gradually. There were two 
possible alternatives for the PSI. One was cooperation with the PDS. 
The other was establishing a third force composed of Segni's group， 
the PSI， Panella's list， the liberals， the republicans， ecologists， which 
would be Iocated in between the PDS and the DC. The latter scenario， 
however， was not realized， because the liberals and the republicans 
were internally divided into the pro-Occhetto group and the Pro-Segni 
group. In such a situation， Occhetto decIared in October that the 
framework of the ρrogressisti should be extended to incIude the 
centrists and that the ρrogressisti would not use the symbol of the 
PDS as a common symbol of the coalition during electoral cam-
pmgns. 
Yet， there remained the problem with the RC. The RC was not 
such a naive party that it simply indulged itself into nostalgia for the 
red flag. It shared a comrnon nature with the Lega in that both of 七
/¥ them were the political forces that embodied citizens，intolerance t08 
the existing regime and orders of political economy.(49) The Rete and 
Verdi clarified that they did not have intention to jojn a coalitionaI 
(49) Patrick McCarthy. 193.“The Italian Communitst Divide-and Do Not 
Conquer，" p.32. 
project which excluded the RC. Moreover， Fausto Bertinotti， new 
leader of the RC， did not unloose criticizing Occhetto. 
The misery of the centrists was reconfirmed at the N ovember 
local elections. The Lega again made an onslaught. lt was noteworthy 
that among the rightist forces the MSI won many victories in the 
South， which was an unprecedented big change. Among the leftists， 
the Verdi and the Rete took a leap forward. The PDS and the RC 
were stable. The victories of the left at the second ballot of December 
stemmed from the coalitional strategies of the ρrogressisti by which 
they obtained wide ranged support for their candidates at the com幽
mune level.剛
The biggest problem with the ρrogresisti was that they embraced 
i1lusions owing to the too dramatic victory in the 1993 local elections， 
which by no means promised another triumph at the coming general 
election. The local elections of J une and N ovember clearly showed 
that the relationship among the traditional political groups was 
experiencing a significant change. First， the political forces出athad 
been controlling ltaly for decades suddenly faded away : the PLI soon 
disappeared ; the PRI were fragmented because of the internal 
confrontation concerning its strategy of electoral cooperation with 
the PSI ; the PSI crashed ; the DC was divided into the PPI (Partito 
Popolare Italiano) and CCD (Centro Cristiano Democratico). Secondly， 
??????
the PDS and the MSI， which had been marginal oppositions， came to 
be recognized as main political parties. Thirdly， new political forces 
emerged. While the Lega and the Rete were already active in the 1992 
(50) 
(51) 
Giacomo Sani. 1994.“Una vigiIia diincertezza，" p. 413・414.
Ibid. p. 415-418. 
elections， the AD and the Patto Segni emerged later and played a 
central role particularly in the electoral reform campaign.(51l 
However， the truly new“entity" that exceeded everyone's expec-
tation entered into the political market from the end of 1993 to the 
beginning of 1994. It was Forza Italia. The rise of Forza ltal必made
a big impact on leftist solidarity. It was true that he existence of the 
RC was stil a difficult matter for the ρrogressisti. Yet， the RC now 
turned to be an indispensable coalitional partner to win the election 
when Forza Ital:勿 madea success in establishing the center-right 
a1iances. On the part of the RC， participating in a leftist alliance 
which included even the “liberals" now could be justified in order to 
confront the “fascist -Ber lusconi aIliances". (52) 
3. THE 1994 ELECTIONS 
THE FOUNDING ELECTION UNDER NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
The Italian political system from autumn 1993 to spring 1994 
experienced a deep and significant change. The foIlowing three 
factors worked behind this.(53)， Firstly， voters' electoral volatility 
further increased. Secondly， the prosecution's investigation on politi-
cal corruption yielded some actual fruit. Thirdly， the new electoral 
倒 SalvatoreVassallo. 1995.“La politica delle coalizioni. Da un sistema 七
partitico al'altro，" p. 79-80. 公
(沼:) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994・“Daipartiti ai poli. La politica delle alleanze，"四
pp. 494-495. 
(54) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994.“Elezioni locali e destrutturazione partitica. La 
nuova legge ala prova，" RivisωItalia加 diScienza Pollitica， xxiv， p. 
107-165. 
law was adopted. 
As a1ready examined， the loca1 elections， which were carried out 
3 or 4 months prior to the March 1994 general elections， already 
indicated some symptoms for fundamental changes that predicted the 
results of the general elections.(54) First of aIl， the cleavages， which 
had emerged between the old forces and the new forces， turned so 
unfavorable to the centrists in particu1ar that they fatally 10st their 
mobilization power. Secondly， a change in voters' preference which 
radically shifted to both ends of the politica1 spectrum created a 
space for the far-rightist mobilization. The MSI in particular took an 
enormous leap forward. Meanwhile， the 1eftist forces around the PDS 
built the electoral cartels and won many victories in various cities. 
Owing to the amendment of the e1ectoral law， the March 27・28
1994 elections showed a completely different configuration. The AN 
was 10cated at the rightist end of the spectrum， and Forza Italia and 
Lega Nord adjacent to it. The PPI and the Patto Segni were situated 
at the center， and the ρrogressisti were on the 1eft. While Forza ltalia 
formed the Polo della libe付。 (theFreedom Alliance) with the Lega 
Nord in northern Italy， itestab!ished the Polo del buongoverno (the 
Good government alliance) with the Alleanza Nazionale in the South. 
The centrists， PPI and Patto Segni， alligned as the Pattoρer L'Italia 
??????
(the Pact for Italy). The leftist progressisti were composed of the PDS， 
(5) Even such an historical election that involved radical changes like the 
1994 elections showed the validity of Bartolini and Mair's proposition. 
See Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity， ComJうetitionand 
Electoral Availabilify .-The Stabilization 01 European Electorates 1885. 
1985， Camblidge University Press. 
Rin前citasociα:listα， cn'stiani sociαli， AD， paiγtito Verdi， Rete， RC， 
socialista. It was broadly anticipated that votes would be volatile， not 
merely because the electorallaw had been changed， but also because 
both of the two traditional parties， DC and PCI， had already 
disappeared. The actual electoral competition was developed among 
the right vs. the center vs. the left. As a matter of fact， the cleavage 
between the center-right and the left could not be filed up. The 
voters' volatility emerged only within each block.(55) The most impor-
tant point in the March 1994 elections was what the candidates， 
parties and coalitions proposed. Their leadership and their potential 
as state managers were ventilated.(56) 
BERLUSCONI'S CALCULATION AND STRATEGY 
The fact that Berlusconi decided to enter into politics just before 
the election proved particularly effective， not simply because he could 
absorb the voters' discontent but also because he did not allow them 
sufficient time to correctly assess what Forza Itali必 was.(57}
According to the preモlectionresearch conducted by the CIRM， 
the support for the ρrogresisti was about 40%， the PPI 20%， and the 
Polo della Liberta-buongoverno 30% as of January 10. However， by 
J anuary 28 the Liberta-buongoverno aIliance took such a large part of 
??????
the support from the ρrogresisti that the former almost caught up 
with the later. On February 4， the relation between the two groups 
(部)
Gianfranco Pasquino. 1995.“Premessa. Le regole e gli atori". 
Luca Meldolesi. 1994. Democrazia e intransigenza : un lamento post-
eletorale. 1 Mulino no. 353. 3/94. p. 437. 
Giacomo Sani. 1994.“Una vigilia di incertezza，" p. 423-425. 
(56) 
(57) 
was completely reversed; liberta司buongover:ηoabout 40% and the 
ρrogressisti about 35%. The difference kept monotonously growing. 
On February 24， the liberta.buongoverno even invaded into the 
centrists to gain the 45% of the votes. Contrarily， the ρ1"ogresisti 
were stil sluggish at the level of the 35% or less， and they were 
forced to see the historical elections in such a dull situation.(58) 
Since Berlusconi's entrance into the political market， many citi. 
zens came to recognize that his electoral strategy was breaking the 
basic precondition of democracy， i.e. equality among the candidates. 
He brought the vast wealth he had amassed as a businessman directly 
into the political arena. His business had a broad effect on almost 
every field of lta1ian civil society. By utilizing not only the TV but 
also newspapers and publishers， he could “edit" the very culture of 
Italy. Thus， itwas simply easy for Berlusconi to make an image as 
if the reality of Italian society existed in the TV studio and he were 
able to rea1ize the electorates' dreams.(59) 
The impact of the TV on the youth， women and housewives was 
so immense that it brought a big success in a very short period. 
Unlike the Lega which had grown on the local bases， Forza Italia was 
the "prodottoρolitico" that rapidly grew through mass media. Its 
influence quickly spread literally al over the country， not being at al 
七 limitedwithin the north， the South， or within particular districts.(60) 
四
When entering into the electoral market， Berlusconi developed his 
六 uniquestrategy of political marketing. The Fininvest， a conglomer. 
(59) Carlo Freccero. 1994. Il presidente virtuale. Micyo Mega 2/94. 
側IlvoDiamanti. 1994. La politica come marketing. Micro Mega 2/94. p. 
66.68‘ 
ate he possessed， covered almost al fields of civil society. He carried 
such strong and huge corporate organizations directly in the field of 
politics. The network of about 14 thousand football fan clubs in 
particular， which consisted of more than one mi1lion members， was 
directly used as the electoral network just like the American Presi-
dential campaigns. 
As often shown under the totalitarian regimes， Berlusconi used 
sports as an instrument. He utilized football fans as the social texture 
for his party.“It you Italians unite each other just as the national 
football team does， you can make a goal!" The slogan of his political 
movement was composed only by vocabulary of sporting journals. He 
used出eMilan fan clubs as a base for political movement. Berlusconi's 
eloquence transmitted through mass media instantly established his 
monopoly of words. His words lacked sophisticated expressions and 
effective arguments_ They were merely a narration of the traditional 
values such as freedom， patriotism， family， company and work. 
Although these claims were just banal， Berlusconi， asa matter of fact， 
had already won within the TV screen. His talk on TV did not 
contain any substantial platforms. Rather， his style of talking was 
just like. a new year's greeting by the “head of the state". Without 
proposing any concrete policies， the “head of the state" only had to 
??????
pronounce some solemn words. He could play a role of the “head of 
the state" without fearing that he were a fake， because he was actually 
the “head of the state" within the limited space of the TV screen.(61) 
Berlusconi's votes concentrated on the North and the South (par-
(61) Massimo Gramellini. 1994. Berlusconi， Ovvero la repubbica del pallone. 
Micro Mega 1/94. 
ticularly Sicilia). Many of them were female votes (55%)， especially 
those of housewives (32・33%).Also， relatively young voters under 35 
years oId strongly supported him (40%). GenericaIly， his supporters 
tended to be decently educated bourgeoisie or more popular strata. 
These electorates firmly believed in enterprises， either small or big， 
as the core of the economy. They had a strong tenacity for the 
institutions regulating the social order (for instance， the judicial 
system). Most of them trusted in the traditional political framework 
and at the same time they were ardent Catholic church frequenters. 
These middle strata sti1l relied on the traditional values and institu-
tions such as family， market and church. 
What kind of the votes of the 1992 elections did Berlusconi take 
from in the 1994 elections? According to the exit-poll by CIRM， about 
30% of those who had voted for the PSI or DC， and about 50% of 
those who had supported the PLI in the 1992 elections voted for Forza 
ltalia in the 1994 elections. Berlusconi was the perfect vent for the 
Tangenta，ρoli scandals and voters who were so fed up with the 
reluctantly voted for the Lega in the 1993 local elections in spite of its 
rather radical stance or voted for the MSI in spite of its dark past 
history. In出eelectoral campaign， Berlusconi proposed what these 
voters exactly expected : cuts in financial deficit， creation of new jobs 
for one million people， recovery of corporate autonomy and enhance-
??????
ment of national pride. These were just vulnerable and naive projects， 
but were effective enough to make such voters excited. Berlusconi's 
political proposal precisely corresponded to the expectations and 
Ilvo diamanti. 194. La politica come marketing. pp. 64-6. (62) 
NEW PARLlAMENT 1994 (SEATS) 
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source : Corriere della Sera， 30 marzo， 1994 
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values of the citizens in these social segments. Advocating the “new 
? ?
?
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Italian miracle" seemed as if it could normalize the situation and 
provide new dreams particularly just after the bad experience of 
instability and uncertainty during the past several years. Such a 
stability-oriented claim based on the old tradition was totally differ-
ent from that of the Lega representing the “anti -systemic" values. (62) 
The overwhelming victory of Forza ltalia indicated the reality to 
smash the illusion that civil society was voluntarily and autonomous-
ly organized. The rightist triumph was attained by utilizing the 
already existing strong bases of the Lega in the N orth and of the MSI 
in the South， inparticular， the robust structure of Berlusconi's enter-
prises and by strengthening these organizations in al directions 
through the country. It is true that the impact of the TV was definite. 
Yet， the TV did not explain al of Berlusconi's victory. It was not 
realized only by his own personality. He carried huge corporate 
organizations into politics in order to turn Forza Italia into a real 
political party. Politics stil organized the territories which could not 
be structured only through mass media. As a matter of fact， among 
the ρrogressisti the Rete which was rooted only in the voluntary young 
generation ended up with a poor electoral result， while the PDS and 
the RC performed relatively well. The AD， too， which often appeared 
in the mass media but did not have any organizational base， produced 
an unsatisfactory result. 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEFTIST DEFEAT 
It seemed that the PCI， the historical opposition party， started its 
transformation into the PDS in order to nip the fruits yielded by the 
fal of the PSI and the DC. The 1993 local elections must have been 
六 aperfect launcher for the accession to poweぽr0ぱfthe PDS. J ust after 
2 ω ocal e川l山批ω叫ecti配倒削“ons，the PDS w … the spr … i汀fit w …en 出
Q n問ex叫tg酔en問er悶alele批配ction附 However，the March 1994 elections produced 
a completely different result. Why did the left lose in the 1994 
側 L 宏司treso.19 dicembre 1993，“Chi ha paura di Baffo di ferro?，" di 
Claudio Rinaldi， p. 40-53. 
elections? Many explanations have been made thus far. The influence 
of TV was certainly immense， but hisiory had an equally significant 
impact.(64) 
The left in Italy， like that in Japan， has traditionally been ambiva-
lent from the very beginning. On the one hand， itclaimed anarchical 
revolutionism， but on the other it advocated cooperative reformism. 
The post-war myth of the PCI， ifanything， was made just because its 
vocabulary was far from the reality of everyday Iife. Even after the 
collapse of Berlinguer's cornpromesso storico， inthe 1980s， the PCI 
was different from other political parties. The PCI became a usual 
party only lately. The PDS， however， was stil seen by Italian voters 
as one variety of the consociationalism of the First Republic in spite 
of its radical transformation. Ironically， its consociational image in 
which the oppositions and the government cooperatively administrat肉
付 thestate instead of the mutual confrontation became even stron喝
ger， although the PCI more ardently tried to promote its renovation 
than ever especially after the 1992 elections in which the PCI declined 
and the Lega rose. The composition of the 1994 elections was the 
confrontation between the new forces and the old forces. The PDS 
was considered as an oId force， a protagonist of the First Republic.(65) 
The defeat of the progressisti in the March 1994 elections was， as 
often argued， a defeat of the intellectual culture vis佐川sthe consum- 六
)¥ erism. Berlusconi controlled the editoria italiana and transmitted such ~ 
五
“culture" through the TV司 Nonetheless，the success of Berlusconi's 
制 PieroIgnazi. 195. Il peso del Pds sul centro・sinistra.11 Mulino 3/95 
Maggio/giugno. p. 458. 
(65) Ibid. p. 458-9. 
style does not explain everything of the 1994 elections. The problems 
existed also on the part of the left itself. The left was not able to 
brush away the dust of the old and statist First Republic， although it 
should have appealed to the importance of conscience and morality 
and should have sought a political project challenging the crime and 
corruption.(66) 
Another cause of defeat could have been the lack of the leadership 
outside the PDS. The rightist faction might not have won only with 
the old町typeparty leaders like Bossi and FinI. Berlusconi's role was 
definitive for the rightist victory.(67) The powerful hegemony of the 
PDS within the ρrogressisti stemmed from the fact that other leftist 
forces lacked organizational rigidity.“Il ca1'isma fo1'se non e tuto. 
(Probably the charisma is not everything.)"(68) If the strong domi-
nance of the PDS in the ρ1'og1'essisti continues， itwill be difficult for 
them to win elections. 
“Maggio1'ita1'io， ma non t1'o仰o.(Majoritarian， but not too much.)" 
Bartolini and D'Alimonte assessed the results of the March 1994 
elections in such words. There was no doubt that the majoritarian 
system worked. Yet， at the same time， the parliament became 
divided. The deputies achieved the majority of the seats， but the 
senates did not， though the majoritarian part of the both reached the 
六側 LucaMeldolesi. 1994. Democrazia e intransigenza : un lamento post-
芸 elettorale.1 Mulino no. 353. 3/94. p. 439. 
一 (67) Gianni Vattimo. 1994. Una sconfitta annunciata. Micro Mega 2/94. 
(68) Ibid. p‘40. 
(69) Stefano Bartolini e Roberto d'Alimonte. 1994.“La competizione mag-
gioritaria. Le origini elettorali del parlamento diviso，" Rivista Itali，αηG 
di Scienza Politica. no. 3， anno xxiv. p. 631-686. 
50% excepting the part of PR. Of course the electoral systems were 
mutually different. However， what affected more was the electoral 
strategies each coalition developed.(69) 
In retrospect， the 1994 elections brought an ironical result. First， 
the very actors that had promoted the political reforms and held the 
initiative of introducing the majoritarian system ended up with 
defeats. The PDS， which had firmly believed its own victory in the 
coming general election when the 1993 local elections finished， easily 
missed office just in front of it within only several months. Mario 
Segni， who came forward as a candidate from Sassari， was defeated 
in the majoritarian part and was barely saved by the partial PR 
system. Secondly， the rightist coalition was actually composed by the 
“old" forces， although it was broadly argued that the new forces had 
won. It was true that he ρrogressisti's claim and candidates were old 
fashioned compared with those of the Forza Italia. Nonetheless， 
Berlusconi， as a matter of fact， dragged the legacy of the Craxi 
government of the 1980s. The AN， too， that stil embraced the strong 
trait of statism， patriotism and reactionalism was about to return to 
the mentality of the inter-war era.(70) 
These elections were， atthe same time， the case in which a typical 
leftist dilemma appeared. The result of the 1994 elections largely 
derived from the fact that the double tour system advocated by the 六
PDS had been時 a凶 nthe process of加 lectorallawame蜘 mt2
The elections， thus， were trilaterally structured among the left， 
center and right， rather than bilateral， inwhich the PDS was again 
(70) Actually， the skinheads supporting the MIS vio!ated minorities on 
stret. 
ノ、
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faced with the typical dilemma : which of the two should the PDS 
choose as a coalitional partner， the ultra left (RC led by Bertinotti) or 
the Center (Segni and Martinazzoli's group)? It did not matter at al 
for the centrist Mario Segni whether he allied with the left or the 
right. He just wanted to realize his dream of becoming Prime 
Minister. Such an ambivalent stance of the centrist allowed the right 
to attain the absolute majority which might have been easily achieved 
by the PDS， PPI and Patto Segni if they were allied. The PDS was 
forced to choose the RC's cooperation since it could not ally with the 
centrist;“Our political stance and policies are so different from those 
of the centrists that we cannot cooperate with them.(71)" 
The electoral result verified that the RC sti1l had considerable 
influences. The left won overwhelming victories in Tuscany， Emilia-
Romagna and Marche. In Turin， Fausto Bertinotti achieved a tri-
umph. The RC， whose share of votes reached almost 10%， was too 
significant existence for the ρrogressisti to break with as a coalitional 
partenr. Nonetheless， the RC was a difficult partner. The leader 
Fausto Bertinotti repeatedly irritated the Italian voters just before 
the election by saying “Italy must withdraw from the N A TO，" and 
“we need to increase taxes just now." His colleagues publicly decIar-
ed“We were born communists. We cannot become sociaI democrats." 
豆 (71) Interview with Caterina Ginsburg， Ufficio Stampa of the PDS. March 
思 24，1994. at th巴headquartersof the PDS， Rome 
(η) Actually， post.industrialization did not realize a paradise. See Mas-
simo Paci. 1992. Il Mutamento della Struttura Sociale in Italia. Il 
お1ulino.
THE PERSISTENT CLEAVAGES 
As a matter of fact， ltalian society was faced with severe 
problems.(72) The unemployment rate did not drop below 12%. While 
the rate in the north was about 7%， that in the south exceeded 20%. 
The unemployment among the youth was particularly severe. Those 
youth who could not find jobs even after graduation from the univer陶
sities seemed to turn their back to the ρrogressisti and to go to the 
right. While the PDS was not able to encourage a hope among the 
youth and the unemployed， itlost the trust of those electorates who 
had voted for the PCI.(73) 
1n fact， new confrontational relationships peculiar to the post-
industrial society emerged in ltaly since the 1980s. Yet， the electoral 
result indicated that the traditional cleavages， too， stil survived in 
addition to such newly appearing post-industrial cleavages. The 
socio-political background of the candidates clearly represents the 
trait of each party.(74) Table 2 shows the income levels of the candi-
dates of the main parties who ran for the 1994 elections. The highest 
income rank beyond 150 mi1lions liras was largely occupied by the 
Forza Italia's candidates. About 53% of the candidates from Forza 
Italia earned 100 milllions and beyond， which was well over the levels 
of the PDS (38.4%)， the PP1 (40.8%)， Lega Nord (24.4%) and the AN 
(但24.7%).lt iおsnoteworthy t出ha幻tabout 0ηef白ou町rt出hoぱfthe candidates from 六
山 Nwe町悦凶r陀削e叶loca仙
p戸roportionof those who obtained 50 mi1lions or less were : the PDSさ
(73) L 'Estresso 15 aprile 1994. p. 54. 
(74) Liborio恥ifatina.1994."I candidati，" Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politicσ. 
anno xxiv， no. 3. 
Table 2 ANNUAL INCOME OF THE CANDIDATES BY PARTY 
as of 1992 in million liras (%) 
il1come rank Pds Ppi Fi Ln An total 
below 34 18.2 8.3 12.5 18.9 24.7 20.1 
35田50 13.7 21.3 9.4 13.5 18.5 14.9 
51-75 9.1 15.7 3‘1 21.6 18.5 14.4 
76-100 20.6 13.9 21.8 21.6 13.6 18.1 
101-150 29.3 27.8 18.8 16.3 16.1 19.6 
150 and b巴yond 9.1 13 34.4 8.1 8.6 12.9 
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) (4) (108) (32) (37) (81) (302) 
source : Liborio Mattina. 1994.“1 candidati，" p. 53. 
31.9%， the PPI 29.6%， Forza Italia 21.9% and Lega Nord 32.4%， the 
AN 43.2%. }i.フrzaltali"a had the smalIest number of the candidates 
with relatively low income， while the AN had the largest number of 
such candidates. 
Table 3 shows the candidates of each party categorized by their 
profession. The PDS had a relatively high proportion of professional 
politicians (20_9%). Forza Italia produced many candidates whose 
background was as entrepreneurs (20.9%)， doctors (16.4%)， lawyer 
(11.8%上Lega Nord had a large group of candidates from the private 
service sector (16.2%). The proportion of teachers and university 
プfprofessorswas next highest to the professional politicians，and the 
12candidates in these three categories occupied about 60%of the total 
六 candidatesfrom the PDS. The AN had a high proportion of lawyers 
(21.6%) and the private service sector (12.7%). Generally speaking， 
Forzaβαlia was based on entrepreneurs， and Lega Nord and the AN 
represented the interests of the self-employed， and the PDS was a 
Table 3 PROFESSION OF THE CANDIDATES BY PARTY (%) 
profession Pds Ln Fi AN 
lawyer 2.4 11.6 1.8 21.6 
doctor 7.3 8.9 16.4 8‘8 
other professionals 4.1 12.5 5.5 4.4 
teachers 15.4 9.8 5.5 7.5 
university professor 16.3 4.5 4.5 1.3 
judge 4.9 1.7 0.4 
entrepreneur 8.9 20.9 8.4 
百lanager 。.8 5.4 6.4 2.2 
commerce/ craftsmen 0.8 8 2.7 4.8 
private serv.ice sector 3.3 16.2 7.3 12.7 
prof巴ssionalpolitician 29.3 5.4 3.5 4.8 
journalist 3.3 2.7 4.5 4.8 
employ巴ein public sector 4 2.7 4.5 5.3 
trade unionist 2.4 1.8 
penslOner 3.3 1.8 0.9 6.2 
others 2.4 1.8 0.9 4 
total 100 100 100 100 
(N) (123) (112) (110) (227) 
source : Liborio Mattina. 1994.“1 candidati，"p. 564. 
party of professional politicians. 
One of the handicaps for the ρrogressisti was that it produced too 
many candidates with professional politicians' background who sti1l 
dragged in the so-called old regime. Contrarily， Tarza Italia was truly 六
born afresh by those who entered into politics for the first time. It 
五
was literally a start from zero for Forza Italia since there were no 七
professional politicians. Instead， the marketing specialists created the 
party. 
What， then， did the relationships between the candidates and the 
Table 4 THE CANDIDATES REPRESENTING INTEREST GROUPS 
(in absolute number) 
coalitions 
Pgr Ppi Pdl-Pbg total 
12 12 
4 5 9 
2 2 
4 4 
27 
interest groups 
Cgil 
Cisl 
Ui1 
Cisnal 
trade unions 
Confindustria 
Confapi 
managers'assoc. 
1 3 
Confagricoltura 
Coldiretti 
Conf. coltivatori 
agricultural assoc. 
????
Confcommercio 
Confartigianato 
Cna 1 
3 
craftsmen's assoc. 
Tota! 20 13 22 
source : Liborio Mattina. 1994."1 candidati"， p.576. 
4 
?????
2 
? ?
??
???
ー
1 
1 
???
55 
interest groups look Iike? Table 4 shows how many candidates the 
六 maininterest groups prepared for each coalition. Among the 27 
五 candidatescoming from the trade unions， 22 candidates ran on the 
ろ ρrogressistiticket， while 5 caildidates ran on the centrist PPI's. There 
was no unionist candidate on the rightist coalition， which clearly 
indicated the unions were unrelated with the right. Concerning the 
managers' side， out of the 7 candidates sponsored by Conjiηdustria， 4 
candidates ran on the rightist coalition's banner， 3 on the centrist's， 
but only one on the ρrogresisti's. Quite contrary to the unions whose 
candidates concentrated on the ρrogressisti， the managers had clear 
inclinations to the right or the center. Compared with the unionists 
and the managers， the agricultural organization and craftsmen's 
organization tended to be印 ntrist.
The candidates showed the same cleavages as the social cleavages 
among the voters : whether they sought a more public dimension in 
the contents of government activities or・theypursued the private 
dimension to the maximum ; whether they agreed to the maintaining 
of the welfare state and providing the workers with social benefits or 
they supported the independent workers. In the actual elections the 
confrontational axis like those “public vs. private"“dependent 
workers vs. independent workers"， appeared， crossing with the 
regional issue of “federalism vs. centralism". The leftist progressive 
alliance， which was composed of candidates of politicians and profes-
sionals， represented the former stance of the confrontational axis. 
The rightist alliance， which consisted mainly of professionals， entre-
preneurs， independent workers， asserted the minimizing of the labor 
market regulation. The candidates of the PPI were located just in 
between the left and the right. Among the PPI's candidates， those 
from the public sector were cIoser to the Ieft， while those with the 六
伽 aI p炉roぱ舟伽仇f白加蜘e出郎s鉛s討io凶 b加a岬 O∞u凶l
Therefore， under the new majoritarian system， the centrists itself d 
were contradicted. Not only the electoral result indicated the cleav-
ages among the voters， but aIso there were clear cIeavages in the very 
composition of the candidates. The former was the direct outcome of 
Chart 1 PARTY'S POSITION IN 4 DIMENSIONS OF CONFLlCTS 
politics vs. markets 
ideological (a) 
non-ideological (b) 
individualism EU Integration 坑rongfederalism 
vs. vs. vs. 
family value neo-statism weak federalism 
(a) pol. mkt (b) pol mkt indiv. family integ. state strong weak 
RC 
Pds 
PpI 
Patto 
Lega 
FI 
An 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
x x X 
x x X 
x x X 
X X 
X X 
source) Paolo Segatti. 1994."I programmi elettorali e ilruolo del mass 
media，" p. 472. 
the latter.(75) 
What kind of characteristics did the electoral programs of each 
party show? Whereas at least up to the 1980s the partisan confronta-
tion during elections concerned ideology，(76) Segatti's analysis indicat-
ed that the 1994 elections were lacking in ideological disputes 
compared with the elections in the past. Here， ideology is defined as 
the programmatic options and arguments presented from a grandiose 
t 五 worldvision to resolve contemporary problems. The parties excep戸
2t}恥 RC凶 n
ノ、
Q made efforts to present feasible answers to the actuaI problems the 
明)Ibid. 
(76) Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 1990. Ident卸" Comtetition and 
ElectoγαIA百ailability.
Italian government was faced with. However， itdoes not mean that 
the stance and policies of each party converged. With regard to the 
economic problems in particular， the cIear divisions emerged. Each 
party had a different stand concerning the relationship between 
economy and politics， or more concretely， the problems of unemploy“ 
ment， financial deficit， and welfare reforms. 
During the 1994 electoral campaigns， the PDS totalIy supported 
broad privatization. J ust like the PPI， the PDS respected the autono-
mous function of markets and saw it indispensable for economic 
growth and social renovation in claiming :“We need the creativity 
based on the moral and material incentives， the boldness to take risks 
freely， and the culture to recognize the specialty of work." Yet， atthe 
same time， itemphasized that the markets were not the final goals 
and that the problems unsolved only within the markets must be 
handed over to politics. This point definitely distinguished the PDS 
from the market supremacist Forza ltalia and Lega Nord. 
Segatti pointed out that the conflict between the left and the right 
with regard to the role of the state and markets was blurred by the 
existence of the statist AN. According to him， the cleavage， which 
separated the left insisting on the necessity of the state's function to 
compensate for the market mechanism from the right pursuing of 
market mechanism at the maximum， became vague because of the 五
Ji、
AN that shared its statism with the left.(77) Such a view， however， こ
ノ、
should be reexamined more carefully. Segatti's image of the left-rigt 
confrontation was single-dimensioned，'‘market vs. welfare state". If 
(7) Paolo Segatti. 1994."1 programmi elettorali e ilruolo del mass media." 
Rivista Italiana di S，αienza Politica. anno xxiv， no. 3. 
the new issue，"autonomous individualism vs. authoritarian collectiv-
ism"， was taken into account simultaneousny just as Herbert Kits-
chelt suggested，(78) the confrontation would be two-dimensioned and 
the cleavages between the left and the right would be clearer. The 
center田lefttargeted broadly from the left-libertarians to the centrists， 
while the right wanted to coopt the wide area from the right authori戸
tarian to the center. The authoritarian statism of the AN was totally 
different from the welfarism of the left. 
CONCLUSION 
Politics is a mirror which precisely reflects society. Italian politics 
is not an exception. The DC government continued for such a long 
period because it represented the electorates， most citizens and the 
very Italian society. It may be difficult for ltalian society that has 
constantly been led by the parties to change politics by its own 
initiative.(79) As a matter of fact， the ltalian citizens did not develop 
an ardent movement for change (with some exceptions like la Rete， 
anti-Mafia movement in Sicily) even at the flux of the reform proc-
ess. The electoral reform was promoted mainly through the moderate 
(78) Herbert Kitschelt. 1994. The Tranゆrmation01 European Social 
五 Democracy.Cambridge University Press. 
主(仰7愉9) Gi泊an昨f仕叩a訂ncoPa叫抑1山 o.1993 ‘“‘τも加加In此1式trod附
六 Gi均anぱ1ぜfranc児∞oPasq午明uinoand Patrick McCarthy， eds.， The End 01 Postω 
war Politics 初 It，αly: The Landmark 1992 Elections. West'可iew.p. 9. 
(80) For this point， see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. 
Tγα悦sitionto Democγαcy : Political Life after Authoγitarian Rule. J ohns 
Hipkins Uniuersity Press. 
pacts set forth by the political elites as often the case with a democra-
tization process under polyarchy(80). The key actors of the Italian 
reform were obviously the politicaI leaders， inparticular Achille 
Occhetto and his colleagues. 
For the reform promoters， the electoraI reform was a severe 
struggle for their survival. Without any particular efforts， their 
collapse might have been inevitable. The political reform was liter-
ally a problem of life and death for the PCI/PDS. The situation was 
not so much different for the PSI and the Catholic left which had 
initially opposed the reform but Iater joined the reformist trend 
advocated by the PDS. The reform， therefore， <:an be viewed as a 
Iogical outcome besed upon the rationaI caIculation of each actor 
within extremely limited space of choices， even though the onset of 
the reform happened to be stimulated by the scandals. 
The Italian case provided a clear pattern of the confrontation 
between two rival groups， as the press word RossoNero (red-black) 
indicated. However， this does not mean that there was no internaI 
conflict within each camp， the Ieft and the right， not to mention the 
breakdown of the Berlusconi government that happened within the 
same year of his inauguration because of the political contradictions 
among Forza Italia， Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale. What should 
be noted is that the PDS， the core partner of the ρrogressisti， failed to 五
a訂r伽 a削 h恥ep卯oli川 ri的山
group) and the old Ieft (Rifondazione Comunista) and could not coopt 
the center. The electoral defeat mainly stemmed from this fact. 
。1)Adam Przeworski. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democraり.Cambridge 
University Press. 
The founding election of 1994 brought a bitter result to the PDS， 
the main actor who had promoted the electoral reform. It was the 
1994 elections that clarified the difficulty for the PDS， just as 
Przeworski theoretically argued，(81) to activate the ltalian economy 
to obtain the support from the largest middle class， while protecting 
the interests of the citizens in periphery. Actually， as already 
examined， the traditional political cleavages stil persisted in Italian 
elections. Yet， the outcome of the 1994 elections was stil transitional. 
Just after the elections， Massimo D'Alema， the would-be successor of 
Occhetto， keenly recognized the sheer necessity to form a broader 
center-left coalition in order to govern ltaly from the left. 
(to be continued) 
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